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HARVARD LAW REVIEW

THREE SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING FUTURE
INTERESTS
i.

G

Tim

TRANSxSSION OF REMAINDERS

EORGE GOLLADAY died in 1854, his widow Nancy, who

died in 1907, surviving him by over half a century. By his
will he gave his real estate to his wife and to her children after her
death; "and if the said Nancy Golladay does not have children that
will live to inherit said real estate, that said real estate, at the
death of Nancy Golloday and her children, fall to Moses Golladay
and his heirs." Nancy, then childless, remarried, and had a daughter who died before her mother. No children survived her. Moses
Golladay died in 1855, leaving two children, William and Mary.
William in i9oo made a warranty deed purporting to convey his
interest in the real estate left by the will, and died intestate in 19o4,
leaving children as his heirs. The Supreme Court of Illinois holds
that no title ever vested in William Golladay, the son of the remainderman named in the will, since he died before the life tenant.
His children are not estopped by the covenants of his deed, for
they do not assert title by descent from him, but as heirs of
their grandfather Moses. Had William survived the life tenant,
the warranty deed would have transferred the remainder, which in
that event would not have passed to others under the terms of the
will. Passing as it did to others, his deed conveyed nothing.,
This decision revives for Illinois, and for contingent remainders;
the common-law rule regarding the descent of remainders and reversions, according to which he who claims by descent must make2
himself heir to him in whom the estate first vested by purchase,
ignoring the qualification added by Watkins that one who exercises
acts of ownership shall be regarded as the purchaser of the reversion or remainder. 3 The rule that in the descent of a reversion and
remainder there is no "mesne heir" but that the one claiming when
the expectant estate vests in possession, claims as heir of the original
IN

1 Golladay v. Knock, 235 IBI. 412, 85 N. E. 649 (i9o8); RsAS, CASES ON FuTmR
PEST s, 178.
2 WATiNs, LAW OF DESCENTS, 118.

3 Ibid., 112, 1i8.
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remainderman or reversioner, is the law in Maryland, 4 but has been
changed by statute in other jurisdictions.5
The following remarks are intended to show why the older rule
revived in part for Illinois is preferable to the rule which is at present
more generally observed.
When a testator creates life estates with remainders, he does one
of two things: he either gives property to a designated person or
persons, subject to a life provision for some other person, or he
makes a life provision and leaves it to be determined by circumstances existing at the end of the life where the property is to go.
These two alternatives represent the real difference between vested
and contingent remainders; "vested subject to be divested," when
applied to an estate in expectancy, is in reality contingent; and
the treating of such a remainder as vested subject to be divested,
for the purpose of avoiding certain restrictions or liabilities attaching to contingent remainders,6 is a mere conventional mode of
construction that should not mislead or confuse us. Whenever a
testator makes a disposition dependent on circumstances existing
at a future time, he seeks to project himself and his will, as far as
feasible, to that point of time; if he could, he would only then make
his dispositions. It may safely be assumed that he does not intend
to benefit persons who would not be the natural beneficiaries of his
will Were his will made at the later point of time. Results contrary
to his presumed interest may, however, easily follow, if remainders
are treated as vested, or if contingent remainders are treated as
descendible, devisable, or alienable. It will then not infrequently
happen that his property at the time to which he desires to project
his control will pass to persons who are strangers to him. So in the
very common case that the remainderman dying in the life of the
life tenant leaves a wife or husband as heir, or that the remainder
descends to a child and the child later dies, leaving the other parent
4 Barnitz's Lessee v. Casey, 7 Cranch (U. S.), 456, 469, 470 (I812); Buck v. Lantz,
49 Md. 439 (1878); and in Georgia, Payne v. Rosser, 53 Ga. 662 (1875).
5 Cook v. Hammond, 4 Mason (U. S.), 467 (1827); Kean's Lessee v. Roe, 2 Harr.
(Del.) xo3 (1835); Hillhouse v. Chester, 3 Day (Conn.), i66 (i8o8); ,Cote's Appeal,
79 Pa. St. 235 (1875); Early v. Early, 134 N. C. 258, 46 S. E. 5o3 (i9o4); Hicks v.
Pegues, 4 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 413 (1852). See the citations in note in KALES, CASES ON
FtrEom INTERESTS, 184.
5 Nonalienability: Blanchard v. Blanchard, x Allen (Mass.), 223 (x86i); 5 GRAY,
4 AsES ON PROPERTY, 2 ed., 77; destructibility: Doe v. Martin, 4 T. R. 39 (1790);
5 GRAY, CASES ON PROPrERTY, 2 ed.,

ss.
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as its heir. To avoid this result, the Supreme Court of Illinois has
in several cases interpreted a remainder not only as contingent,
but as contingent upon the remainderman outliving the life tenant.
So in the common form of limitation "to my wife for life, upon her
deaih to my children, and if any of my children die leaving issue
either before me or before my wife, then the issue of the child so
dying shall take the share which the parent would have taken if
living at her death," the children take remainders contingent upon
their surviving the wife, 7 with the result that if a child leaves husband or wife, but no issue, the husband or wife will take nothing.
In most states there is probably no hard and fast rule preventing
courts from seizing upon slight forms of expression to read a contingent remainder as contingent upon the contingent remainderman
surviving the life tenant, and particularly the provision in favor
of his issue, should he die before the life tenant, will aid that construction. The trouble is that such a construction would aid the
testator's scheme only if he had made express provision for issue
of the contingent remainderman, for normally the testator desires
that a contingent provision for a relative should inure to the benefit
of the latter's children should he die prior to the happening of the
contingency. The rule in Golladay v. Knock is an additional aid
in carrying out the testator's presumable intent, for while it lets in
the son of the contingent remainderman, it does not let in either
the son's wife or the son's mother, should the son die before the
interest vests in possession. If, however, the testator's presumable intent is to shut out all those who are strangers to his blood,
the rule of Golladay v. Knock does not go far enough, for it lets in
the contingent remainderman's wife, so far as she is her husband's
heir. The shutting out of all strangers requires either an explicit
appropriate provision or a statute.
An abstract direction inserted in a will that a remainder shall not,
while it is still an interest in expectancy, pass to strangers, would
of course be futile; a testator can neither alter the legal course of
descent nor render property inalienable. The only common-law
exception to this rule is the estate tail. At common law a remainder in tail will prevent the property from passing out of the stock
7 Cummings v. Hamilton, 220 Ill. 480, 77 N. E. 264 (igo6); 1ALEs, CASES ON
INTEaESTS, '75; People v. Byrd, 253 IlL. 223, 97 N. E. 293 (1912); KAIMS,

FuTuO

id., 477.
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by any testamentary act; and before the remainder hasvested in possession, the remainderman in tall cannot dispose of his interest (by
common recovery or its statutory substitute) without the concurrence of the life tenant. In this country the entail legislation of the
state where the land is situated will have to be carefully examined,
and in most states it will be found that the remainder in tail is
not available for the testator's purpose. In any event it would not
serve in case of personal property.
What the testator can do is to create alternative contingent
limitations. This is what the Supreme Court of Illinois did for
the testator in Golladay v. Knock. It construed the contingent
Temainder in fee as a remainder in the alternative to the person
named or to his heirs at the time of the vesting of the possession.
Under the facts of that case the construction operated to exclude
the stranger claiming under the nonsurviving heir of the remainderman. Had the remainderman, however, died leaving no children,
but a widow surviving the life tenant, she would under the law of
descent of Illinois have been the heir to the extent of one half of the
property. The form of limitation "to B or his heirs" is therefore
not adequate. The proper form is: to A for life, remainder to B and
his heirs,or if B dies duringthe life of the life tenant, to such heirs of B
as would be also heirs of my own, had I died immediately after the life
tenant.
Ifthis form is substituted for "to A for life, remainder to B and
his heirs" (instead of for: to A for life, remainder to B or his heirs),
the testator should bear in mind that he turns a vested into a contingent remainder, and that the latter may violate the rule against
perpetuities where the former would not. That simply means that
a testator, intent upon pushing his tying-up scheme to the furthest
limits, will encounter legal obstacles of one sort or another. In the
ordinary case of life estates confined to the first generation, the
testator has his free choice between vested and contingent provisions following the life estate, and the natural desire of keeping
remainders from passing to strangers can be given full effect.
The difficulty arising from the rule against perpetuities would be
avoided by a statutory rule for the transmission of remainders.
The rule would be substantially as follows: "A remainder given to a
relative shall before it vests in possession be transmissible by intestacy, will, or gift in the nature of a provision, to such heirs of the.
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remainderman only as would be also heirs of the original testator
or donor had he lived until after the death of the life tenant. This
rule shall apply by analogy to personal property and to executory
limitations." This rule would, in accordance with the presumed'
intent of the giver, exclude also the adopted child of the remainderman.
A gift in remainder not to a relative may well be left to explicit
testamentary provision, if testator desires to keep it in the stock
of the donee. If a statutory provision were deemed desirable, it
would have to restrict transmission to descendants of the remainderman.
The suggested rule would not touch alienation inter vivos except
where it is a gift in the nature of a provision. In so far s speculative dispositions are considered undesirable, they may be left to
any existing restrictive rules, and they would in any event be
effectually discouraged by the risk purchasers would 'run of not
outliving the life tenant; a disposition in the ordinary course of
business or management, however, which may be effected by remaindermen joining with life tenants, so far as it is possible now,
ought not to be rendered impossible, but on the contrary facilities
should be created where they are now lacking.
A rule restricting the transmissibility of remainders would in a
manner revive the policy of the doctrine of "last seised" in the common law of descent. So long as the law did not recognize husband or
wife as possible heirs, and so long as here was a rule forbidding the
passing of property from the paternal to the maternal stock and
vice versa, that doctrine had an extremely limited application. The
rule now suggested would in one sense be of much wider application,
for it would include devise as well as descent, and personal as well
as real property, but it would recognize, as the common law recognized, that so long as a person has a merely expectant or future
interest in property, the expectancy is not an asset to which persons
having no blood connection with the source of the property have any
equitable claim. If it be suggested that the rule would operate
harshly with respect to a widow, let it be remembered that dower
presupposes seisin, and that the law makes no provision for the
widow of a son dying before his father, out of the father's estate,
while it makes such provision for the issue of the son.
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SEPARABILITY OF LiMITATIONS

Gray, in The Rule Against Perpetuities, says:
"Very often, indeed generally, a future contingency which is too remote may in fact happen within the limits prescribed by the Rule against
Perpetuities, and a gift conditioned on such a contingency may be put
into one of two classes according as the contingency happens or does not
happen within those limits; but unless this division into classes is made
by the donor, the law will not make it for him, and the gift will be
bad altogether." 8 And he illustrates: "Thus a gift to B. if no child of A.
reaches twenty-five is bad, although A. dies without children; while if
the gift over had been if A. dies without children, or if his children all die
under twenty-five, then on A.'s death without children, the gift over
would have taken effect." 9
The rule may be English law; but it is submitted that it is a most
unreasonable rule. The rule should be that if a remote limitation
not only in its terms logically includes a valid limitation, but also
leaves'no doubt whatever as to what the valid limitation thus
included is, and 'the valid limitation plainly carries out the testator's intent, the valid limitation will be given effect.
To apply this rule, not only should, in the instance given by Gray,
the gift over be given effect if A died without children, but also if
his children all died under twenty-one. "To the unborn son of A.,
but if he dies under twenty-five, over" - clearly includes: but if he
dies under twenty-four, under twenty-three, under twenty-two, or
under twenty-one; and if he dies under twenty-one, the gift over is
valid. If he dies over twenty-one, the gift, unless it can be saved
on some other principle, is invalid, because remotely taken away
from him, and therefore remains in him. There cannot be the
slightest difficulty of validating a limitation under the circumstances
indicated. It is conceded that there is no sense in the English rule.
Jessel, M. R., says: "This is a question of authorities." "The law
is purely technical." 10 Why should American courts follow such a
rule? Simply from that sense of reverence which, as has been
happily said, is always at the service of the incomprehensible.
The English Real Property Commissioners recommended a change
8 § 331.

§ 332.
10 Miles v. Harford, 12 Ch. D. 691, 703, 704 (1879); quoted, GAY, THE 1RuLE
AGAINsT PERPETuiTIE_, § 349, note.
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of the rule by statute, but it can be changed by the simple process
of logical reasoning. n
The rule may be put in this way: If I am promised more than can
be validly promised, I am at least entitled to as much as can be
validly promised if it can be separated from the excess. In New
York a person having wife or children may not give by will to
charity more than one half of his estate; should he give all, is not
the charity entitled to one half ? The law expressly so provides, but
any court would give this construction to the statute. An option12
v. Gomm.
unlimited in time was held void in London & S. W. R. Co.
The option there was bargained for in i865; it was sought to be13
exercised in i88o, i. e., within sixteen years. In Barton v. Thaw,
the option was sought to be exercised after thirty years. The option
would have been good if in terms limited to twenty-one years; why
should it not have been sustained for that period? It is not convincing to answer that the courts cannot arbitrarily fix upon twentyone years, since the parties might have stipulated for a life in being
plus twenty-one years. Business transactions, particularly where a
corporation is concerned, are normally measured by years and not by
lives, and the reasonable period for which powers of sale unlimited
in time are sustained is twenty-one years.
In some classes of cases it may be doubtful whether the court
should cut down rather than annul. If I have bargained for more
than I can validly take, I may be entitled to less, but I am not
necessarily required to take less, and this works both ways, if the
transaction is a two-sided one. If a lease is good only for twentyone years, the question whether a ninety-nine year lease should be
sustained for twenty-one years must depend upon a variety of
circumstances, the amount of rental, covenants, etc. In a sense a
court in such a case must speculate as to intent, and this the English
courts seem averse to doing, while American courts are more
liberal. It is true that the Supreme Court of the United States has
a rule similar to the English rule now under discussion against
separating the valid from the invalid aspects of a statute where
both aspects are covered by the same phrase;14 but in these cases
AY, ibid., p. 6oo, note 3.
Ch. D. 562 (1881).
13 246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312 (1914).
14United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1875); Trademark Cases, zoo U. S. 82 (1879);
Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (19O8).

n See G
1
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the court was justified in refusing to give to a legislative policy
effect in a more restricted field of application than Congress had
specified. The rule is not one of mechanical operation, and where
a statute contains in different clauses valid and invalid provisions,
courts regularly inquire into the presumable legislative intent. It
seems that in England, where a testator separates his gift into parts,
and then gives part under valid, part under invalid limitations,
the valid part is sustained without question, 5 whereas an American
court will ask whether by reason of the entirety of the testator's
scheme the invalid part does not also vitiate the valid." The
American rule is sensible, although it cannot be applied without
speculating as to testator's intent.
The conclusion must be in favor of a judicial power of cutting
down unlimited or excessive periods to the permissible limit. The
trouble with the doctrine of separable limitations is the failure to
distinguish between that which is matter of clear logical implication and that which is not. It is common sense to assert that a
gift over upon dying under twenty-five may be sustained as a gift
over upon dying under twenty-one; it does not follow that a gift
to an unborn person at twenty-five can be sustained as a gift to an
unborn person at twenty-one. When Sir William Grant suggested '7
that it might have been as well if the courts had held a limitation
transgressing the limits to be void only for the excess where that
excess could be clearly ascertained, he lent some countenance to a
theory of cutting down which certainly cannot be supported as a
mere matter of logic. A gift at twenty-one is not logically included
in a gift at twenty-five, because the former is a larger gift, and the
more is not included in the less.
Is it possible to sustain the gift to the unborn son of A at twentyfive by making it read as follows: "to the unborn son at twenty-five
if he reaches that age within twenty-one years from his father's
death"? This is clearly included in the contingency of his reaching
twenty-five at any time. The usual objection to this method of
validation is that the law permits the selection of any life as a
"criterion" life. If Herbert Spencer could by his will postpone the
ultimate vesting of interests to the death of the last survivor of
1 Cattlin v. Brown, ii Hare, 372 (1853).
15 Barrett v. Barrett, 255 IM.332, 99 N. E. 625 (1912).

17Leake v. Robinson, 2 Meriv. 363 (1817).
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the descendants of Queen Victoria living at his death, why should
not a similar implication be made in favor of every will? The objection is specious, and it can be readily understood why, with the
latitude permitted by the law as to the selection of criterion lives,
the cutting down process suggested might have appeared to the
courts to be too conjectural.
Still in practically every case the criterion life naturally suggests
itself. "To the unborn son of A at twenty-five;" not only would A's
life be the one to be naturally selected, but it is also the normal
expectation that A will not die until his children are four years old.
It would be a simple matter to frame a rule to the effect that any
gift to unborn persons at an age older than twenty-one shall be
construed as implying the condition that such age shall be reached
within twenty-one years from the death of the parent (if a relative
of the testator), through whom they are related to the testator. It
would not have been impossible for the courts to imply such a condition; it would certainly be possible for the legislature to imply it
without in any way altering the substance of testator's gift. Such
an implied condition would also save many gifts to classes now held
invalid. It would be a more satisfactory way of saving them than
through construction. I do not subscribe to the rule that "every
provision in a will or settlement is to be construed as if the Rule
[against Perpetuities] did not exist, and then to the provision so
construed the Rule is to be remorselessly applied." 18 If this is the
rule of the English law, it is an unreasonable rule which American
courts should be slow to follow. However, if a gift to a class under
ordinary rules of construction violates the rule against perpetuities,
it is a very dubious remedy to save the gift by cutting down the
class; for this means benefiting some members of the class at the
expense of others, while the invalidity of the entire gift may let in all
the members of the class as heirs or next of kin. In which way the
most equitable result will be reached may depend entirely upon circumstances unforeseeable at the time of testator's death. The choice
is therefore between adhering to established rules or permitting
the courts to speculate upon probabilities, and the established rule
is preferable. But I am inclined to think that the courts should have
the right to limit a class to the members existing at testator's death,
notwithstanding a postponed period of distribution, where the
18 GRAY, THE RULE AGANgT PERP.PETUITEs, 2 ed., § 629.
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admission of possible additional class members would produce invalidity, and where by reason of the age of parents the testator
may be presumed to have contemplated no additional members.
Of course, if the rule is altered so as to admit additional members of the class without any risk of invalidity, so much the better.
Wherever reasonable construction can save a gift which, under
purely technical rules of construction, violates the rule against
perpetuities, the gift ought to be saved. If the law is now otherwise,
it ought to be changed; if the English law is otherwise and is nineteenth-century law, it should not be followed. But an alteration of
the rule so as to make it operative only for the excess of a gift
above the permissible limit will probably be found to be an impossibility. The result would be an arbitrary enlargement of gifts
quite outside of testator's intent. The illustrations given in Gray,
sections 886-893, will make this clear. The only method of cutting
down limitations is upon the theory of severability, and that method
ought to be applied more liberally than it is.
Even under the law as it stands it is open to a testator to guard
against the construction that has proved fatal to so many wills.
The following provision would serve the purpose:
"All limitations in this will contained shall be deemed to be conditioned
upon their taking effect as vested interests or estates in possession or
remainder within twenty-one years from the death of the last survivor
of the beneficiaries named in this will [or of the descendants of my
parents] 19 who shall be living at my death."
3. THE POLICY AGAINST RE

TENsS"

Most of the highly developed systems of law have some policy
against perpetuities; but in the systems other than that of the
common law it is a policy confined to testamentary or family
settlements of property made for successive generations, and to
dispositions in mortmain. The common law of England alone formulates the policy as a general rule of the law of property- However, not only does the rule find its common application in family
settlements, but as soon as we pass beyond these we encounter
uncertainty, if not confusion. Confined to family settlements, the
19The words in brackets would operate to save gifts to grandchildren, nephews or

nieces, and grand-nephews or grand-nieces whose parents are not beneficiaries under
the will.
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question whether the rule is one against remoteness or one against
inalienability is of little practical importance, for remote limitations
normally result in inalienability, and inalienability was undoubtedly
the inconvenience against which the rule was primarily directed.
When we come to other arrangements involving remoteness, the
remote interest is normally alienable, or at least releasable, and
we search laboriously for a reason that will explain why a remote
option is against public policy. Professor Gray suggests, that property that is liable to be divested by a remote contingency is not
apt to be used to the best advantage of the community. 0 This is
true only if we understand "remotely contingent" as meaning contingent for a period lasting 'until a remote time, not if it means
contingent at a remote time; yet the rule applies also in the latter
sense, although it is clear that an option exercisable only at the end
of fifty years leaves the property freer than an option exercisable
at the end of twenty-one years.
In a family settlement we are also ordinarily relieved from making
a distinction between vested and contingent, for remote limitations
are normally affected by the chances of birth and death, and hence
contingent; but in a remote option the difference between vested
and contingent becomes extremely fine.2 1 In Woodall v. Clifton 2
the court, in holding a remote option void, does not refer to the
difference between vested and contingent, but merely to all executory limitations other than those subsequent to an estate tail.
According to Gray,2 a devise to A and his heirs, to begin from a
day fifty years after the testator's death, is too remote, although
admittedly there is nothing contingent about it. What other than a
technical reason can be given for such a rule? It can be defeated by
a slight change of form, for the validity of a devise to A and his heirs
subject to a term of fifty years given to my executors, is unquestioned.
A devise to A and his heirs, to begin from a day fifty years after
my death, is a form of disposition that is not likely to occur. A
similar devise to an institution or charity is less improbable and
deserves consideration. There may be a sound legal policy against
remotely effective dispositions; if so, such policy should not be
20 GRAY, ME RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 2 ed., § 603 f.
21

Ibid., §

230

a and b; Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 357,

' [19os] 2 Ch. 257.
23 GRAY, TaE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES,

2

ed., §

201,

92

At].

note.

312 (1914).
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bound by the technicalities of the rule against perpetuities. There
should be a clear realization of the substantial difference between
vested and contingent; between a rule of property and a rule of
contract, and between individual and corporate transactions.
Assuming a devise to some university to begin after fifty years
to be void for remoteness, the same would be true of a bequest of a
library, the same of a fund consisting of securities, whether already
existing or directed to be set aside. How about a legacy of $io,ooo?
The rule against perpetuities is a rule of property, not of contract.2 4
A promise to pay $io,ooo fifty years after my death would generally
be regarded as good. It may be said that a promise is a pure obligation, while a legacy is enforceable in equity and can be collected
by making the residuary legatee refund after the executor has paid
him. But in this respect the position of the creditor is even better
than that of the legatee. The effect of the law of administration of
decedent's estates is to transform every pure obligation after the
death of the obligor into an obligation of a specific fund, namely, the
estate left by the obligor. In reason, therefore, legacies and promises to pay should stand on the same footing as far as the question
of remoteness is concerned. The difference between property
and contract breaks down.
We are not prepared to declare a promise payable fifty years after
the death of the promisor to be void; for that would nullify every
promise to pay at a time later than twenty-one years from date,
considering that it is not certain that the promisor will live for an
hour after making the promise. We should therefore be prepared to
sustain also a legacy payable fifty years after death.
Practically, under the law of administration, the executor would
have to make the same provision in both cases. He would have to
set apart a sum sufficient to produce in fifty years the required
amount. That would be equivalent to setting aside a fund for
accumulation. A question would arise under statutes against
accumulations: can a thing be done by indirection which cannot be
done directly? In England the Thellusson Act makes in this respect
a distinction between debts and ordinary legacies, permitting accumulations for the payment of the former; but in America debts
and legacies would generally be subject to the same rule. Assuming
that accumulation is not forbidden by law, may the legatee or
24Worthing Corporation v. Heather, [i9o6]

2

Ch.

532.
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creditor on general principles demand immediate payment of the
sum, which, by accumulation would produce the amount of his
claim, considering that he represents the only interest that is to be
protected? The law of Illinois gives every holder of a nonaccrued
claim after the death of the debtor the right to immediate payment
on deduction of an appropriate discount. A legacy payable thirty
years after testator's death was sustained in Illinois as a vested
interest; 25 but there the interest was given with the principal and
directed to be paid annually, and the court refused to enter upon
the question of the postponed payment of the principal. 26 It thus
appears that the postponed or remote promise has its problems and
difficulties, and the striking fact is that they apply to legacies and
to debts alike. No similar difficulty would arise in case of a gift
of a library or a gift of a piece of rand, to become effective fifty
years after death. In other words, where remoteness creates embarrassment, we have no clear rule against remoteness, while we
have one where it serves little purpose. What do we gain by asserting the rule as a rule of property and denying it as a rule of
contract? It would be better to have no rule at all against remote
executory interests which are free from any contingency.
The importance of any such rule is much diminished by the
fact that remoteness without some element of contingency is of
infrequent occurrence outside of corporate transactions. An individual promise to pay at a time beyond the period of the rule
against perpetuities is even more rare than a legacy remotely postponed without any contingency. But we approach a much more
practical question when.we come to consider contingent promises.
A covenant for title and an indemnity bond are obligations of
common occurrence; they are apt to be made for contingencies
without limit of time, and it has never been suggested that the rule
against perpetuities should apply to them.
But how does such an obligation operate after the death of the
obligor? That depends upon the state of the law of the administration of decedent's estates with regard to contingent claims
against the estate. And here we enter upon a somewhat obscure
field. Under the English law the executor is normally liable indefinitely; 2 7 he can discharge himself by refusing to pay legacies
2" Ibd., 478.
27But note the application of the Trustee Act, 1888, § 8, sub-sec. i (b).

25 O'Hare v. Johnston, 273 IlR. 458, 113 N. E. 127 (1916).
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except under order of a court, and the liability then devolves upon
legatees or distributees.2 1 In America the matter is governed in a
general way by statutory provisions regarding presentation of
claims against the estate, which however frequently neither mention nor fit contingent claims. In some states contingent claims
are required to be presented within the brief period prescribed by
29
law (often only one or two years). Such is the law of California.
This mode of provision will be presently considered. In other
states the provisions of law are such that it may well be contended
that contingent claims require no presentation, since there is no
conceivable method indicated of dealing with them. Illinois is in
that category. In that state the executor's liability ceases, the
same as in England, after he has distributed under the order of
the court.30 It has been said that in Illinois the statute is interpreted to mean that the claim is barred also against the legatees
or distributees.1 But this seems to be an error. The opinion in
People v. Brooks3 2 may seem to lend some countenance to this view;
but if the facts of the case are examined as they appear from the Appellate Court Reports,3 it will be found that the claim was on a
guardian's bond and that the infant became of age before the expiration of the period of administration, so that the obligation of the
bond was then broken, and the claim should have been presented as
a matured or accrued claim against the estate of the surety; failure
to present discharged the distributees, and the claim was absolutely
barred.
It must frequently happen that a contingent liability first becomes an actual liability long after the obligor's death and after
his estate has been distributed to next of kin and legatees. They
may therefore for years be liable to a remotely contingent obligation, of the existence of which as likely as not they will be entirely
ignorant. If there is a policy against remoteness, it operates with
the same force whether it is a question of a liability to incur a
pecuniary obligation or of losing some specific property. If there
is a rule of law in the latter case, why not in the former? The law
Re King, [1907] I Ch. 72.
or Civ. PRoc., §§ 1648, 165x.
30 Snydacker v. Swan & Co., 154 Il. 220,40 N. E. 466 (I895).
31 Professor Warren in 32 HARV. L. REv. 3I5, 321, 332.
2 123 Il. 246, 14 N. E. 39 (1887).
33x5 Ill. App. 57o (1884).
28

29 CODE

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

may well permit a person to bind himself contingently for the period
of his life or a shorter period, or to bind himself and his estate for a
reasonable time; but to bind indefinitely successive generations of
beneficiaries by will or intestacy does not seem reasonable.
But can any remedy be suggested that will relieve the situation?
If the rule against perpetuities were applicable, it would mean that
every contingent liability would have to be expressly limited to a
period, the most natural maximum limit of which would be the life
of the obligor and twenty-one years thereafter. Under a theory of
separability of limitations an unlimited contingent obligation might
be reduced to the same limit. A statutory rule establishing a like
maximum limit for noncorporate obligations would therefore not
seem inappropriate.
Were such a statute proposed, conservative legal sentiment
might be expected to protest against so radical an innovation upon
the law of warranty and suretyship.
Let us then consider a much more plausible proposition and see
how it would operate. In California, and in the states following her
legislation, a contingent claim must be presented against the estate
of the obligor in due course of administration; otherwise it will be
barred. A similar requirement was recently proposed in Illinois
in connection with a comprehensive revision of the law of administration but failed to become law. If the claim is presented, the
court is in a general way required to make provision for meeting or
protecting it, and the claim will be saved in the absence of other
arrangements.
Under legislation of this kind the practical result will be in the
great majority of cases that the contingent liability will be extinguished at the end of the period prescribed for presenting claims.
For contingent claims of the perpetual kind, such as warranties
and indemnity assurances, while as yet contingent, are very apt to
appear to their holders as unsubstantial; the beneficiaries rarely
watch them with any care because they do not expect they will
ever have occasion to have recourse to them; hence only in the
rarest cases will they be presented. An almost inevitable default
will have the practical effect of a limitation. If the contingent claim
is presented, the court may require next of kin or legatees to renew
the obligation to the extent of the assets received by them respectively. That would at least have the advantage of placing them
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on their guard; otherwise the liability would remain as it is now.
However, in jurisdictions in which the necessary facilities exist,
,the court might well consider the transformation of the obligation
into an insurance policy, to the acceptance of which in lieu of his
personal claim the obligee might be expected to consent readily.
Such a course would result in the final extinguishment of all individual liability.
The simple provision requiring the presentation of contingent
claims will therefore in normal cases have the effect of reducing the
life of such claims to the life of the obligor and a brief period thereafter. In view of this, a direct change of the law to the same effect
can hardly be pronounced revolutionary. It would simply serve to
express the true nature and function of contingent obligations. If
they are not by their terms or by the nature of the subject matter
limited to brief periods, they should be treated as purely personal
liabilities. If conditions call for indefinite or perpetual warranties
or indemnities, that need should be met by corporate insurance or
suretyship.
Ernst Freund.
UNnMRSITY OF CMCAGO.

